At times, government leaders, planners, environmentalists, and advocates in California can lose sight of the bigger picture.  Even with all of our immediate problems, one of our biggest challenges in the coming decades will be population growth: our state of 38 million will add another 10 million people over the next 20 years.  For reasons ranging from Climate Change to Peak Oil to declining public health to congested infrastructure to simple geographic limits, California will not be able to tolerate a continuation of its past suburban growth paradigm .  We must grow in a more smart and sustainable manner, which means channeling a significant amount of development back into our urban cores.  Within the Bay Area, there are only a few large-scale opportunities for such growth: Hunters Point, Treasure Island, and the Eastern Neighborhoods in San Francisco, the Broadway corridor and Oak to Ninth in Oakland, the Salt Works in Redwood City, and Alameda Point in Alameda.

This Tuesday, Alameda will vote on Measure B, which will decide whether or not to approve SunCal’s plan for the city’s gigantic decaying Naval base that has been abandoned for almost two decades.  After 12 years of planning, SunCal has submitted a plan that would bring 10,350 new residents, 9,590 new jobs, two new schools, and 145 acres of open space (including a 58-acre sports complex and 15 miles of bicycle routes) to the site.  This vote should be extremely close, and will probably come down to two major issues: traffic and density.

From the beginning, Alameda Point has posed significant challenges to redevelopment due to the infrastructural limitations of Alameda’s West End.  Unlike the East End, which has three bridges connecting it to neighboring Oakland, the West End relies only on the Webster and Posey tubes as its only connection off the island.  With each tube currently at capacity, every morning traffic backs up well into the West End, causing some residents to drive miles out of the way to the East End for an easier exit.  Although Alameda has great potential for transit and bicycle use, its underdeveloped bus service and extremely poor bicycle connection to Oakland fails to draw enough people away from driving.  40 years ago, these same concerns over traffic produced Alameda’s Measure A.

Resulting from a backlash against developers in the 1960s, Alameda’s Measure A was passed in 1973 to essentially outlaw multi-family housing in order to prevent redevelopment and limit traffic.  While Measure A is among the harshest lot size restrictions in Northern California, it came at a time when Victorians were being bulldozed weekly to make way for new apartments and condominiums, seemingly stripping the city of its sense of identity.  Two major bay-fill projects—the development of the South Shore and Bay Farm areas—further contributed to the fear that Alameda was being overtaken by developers.  The anti-growth movement that produced Measure A is rightfully credited for preserving Alameda’s unique charm, but it has also hindered the city from creating livable neighborhoods that support walking, bicycling, and transit use.  Having constructed very little housing and no new apartments in nearly 40 years, Alameda has become increasingly unaffordable, even after the housing crash.  While many Alamedans still ardently cling to Measure A with their “Low Density=Less Traffic” lawn signs, a growing number of residents are recognizing the need for new housing if done properly.

Because of Alameda’s past experiences with major developments, it is logical to expect that Alameda Point’s redevelopment would be met with significant skepticism and opposition stemming from fears of another traffic-inducing development disconnected from the core of Alameda; but, the Alameda Point Plan has responded to these challenges with an innovative set of transportation mitigations which will result in only a slight increase in overall car trips.  The plan calls for nearly as many new jobs as new residents, making longer commutes unnecessary for some of its residents.  For trips outside of Alameda Point, SunCal will provide $200 million in island-wide infrastructure improvements, including a vastly improved ferry to San Francisco, a new BRT system linking Alameda Point with Downtown Oakland, the 12^th St. and Fruitvale Bart stations, and the rest of Alameda, and a dramatically improved bicycle network (which, coupled with a new bridge to Oakland’s Jack London Square, could make Alameda one of California’s premier bicycling cities).  In addition, unbundled parking, mandatory transit passes, and an on-site transportation coordinator would help to limit automobile use and promote transportation alternatives.  SunCal’s redevelopment of Alameda Point would not only produce a walkable, bikeable, transit-oriented neighborhood, it would give Alameda the complete transit system that it deserves.

Tuesday’s vote is one of the most pivotal moments in Alameda’s history.  A yes vote ensures a more sustainable and affordable Alameda and significant housing relief for the region, while a no vote preserves the status quo of an increasingly gentrified and congested island, a decaying and contaminated Naval base, and a more sprawling region.  I am sympathetic to those in favor of redevelopment but concerned over the complex developer agreement, but this is a case where Alameda voters need to realize that no perfect deal will ever exist, and this is still a solid plan will a committed developer that wants to get building.  Most importantly, the cost of doing nothing is not zero: a no vote means Alameda will miss out on a BRT system, a vastly improved ferry, new schools, tons of open space, $12 million in yearly tax revenue, and countless other benefits.  Please, Alameda, if you care about the sustainability and livability of your city and your region, vote yes on Measure B.

UPDATE: Measure B was dealt an embarrassing defeat with 85% of Alamedans voting against it, a product of bad timing, a huge anti-Measure B movement, and a mediocre measure to begin with.  The reality is that not many leaders came out to support it in the first place because it was such a risky and uncertain issue (the developer agreement really doomed the entire project).  It will be interesting to see whether or not SunCal sticks with the project–it sounds like they might be willing to renegotiate and give the project one last shot through other means besides a ballot measure, but who knows what will happen at this point.  One thing is certain: the Point will not change anytime soon–just how the “Low Density=Less Traffic” crowd wanted.

Oakland has long been one of the nation’s largest underserved trade areas for comparison goods… Oakland currently exports 75% of its potential sales in this category or roughly $1 billion in sales every year to neighboring communities.   This loss translates into $10 million in sales tax revenue and 10,400 retail jobs.  While the City has many fine merchants, it lacks many larger retailers and a critical mass of retail selection.  This dearth of retail options discourage residents from shopping locally. This directly diminishes Oakland’s tax base that supports road maintenance, clean parks, and functional city services.

The Upper Broadway Strategy estimates that potential development of this 50 acre section of Broadway could result in approximately 1 million square feet of retail space and 834-1761 residential units with estimated revenue generating floor area of 2.37 million square feet with the potential to create $3 million  annually in sales tax revenue.

I am all for this project (Alternative 1–Urban Mixed-Use Retail is by far the best option), but if you go to the meeting tonight (I can’t), please ask this question:

How is it consistent with the city’s goals of sustainability and affordability when the plan calls for as many as 8,357 parking spaces and 2:1 residential parking ratios?  Is it really feasible to expect the city to contribute $50 million in parking subsidies to cover the excessive costs of so many parking spaces?  Or should the city be pursuing an alternative which cuts costs to the city, developers, commercial tenants, and residents, such as a streetcar?

($40,000 per space x 8,357 parking spaces=$334.28 million worth of parking… Cutting that figure by just 15% would generate $50 million for a streetcar–almost enough to cover the costs of an Upper Broadway-Jack London Square line)

Portland's Pearl District is one of the truly unique neighborhoods on the West Coast

I recently returned from a few days up in Portland, a city well-known as being decades ahead of its peers when it comes to urban planning.  While I wont go into as much detail as my examination of innovative urban policies in Colorado, I took away three primary elements of Portland’s planning paradigm which have helped it to earn the title of most sustainable city year after year.

Element #1: The Urban Growth Boundary

Portland's UGB is the single most important policy in understanding the region's successes.

In Portland, land is a limited resource.  For the past 30 years, Portland has protected farmland and open space by limiting the development of sprawling suburbs and exurbs through strict controls over the location of growth.  When done right, an urban growth boundary can be the single most effective policy to create a livable and sustainable city and region.  By containing sprawl, Portland makes the most of its built environment, which mostly resembles a less-congested Berkeley density-wise.  What really blew me away was the sheer number of vibrant neighborhood commercial streets that were often within only blocks of one another–NW 21st and NW 23rd, Hawthorne and Belmont, not to mention the entire Pearl District–something which could not occur in a more heavily suburbanized region with a greater presence of strip malls.

There are a number of misconceptions that result from Portland’s UGB.  Contrary to the claims of libertarian critics, the UGB has not stopped all growth and led to an unaffordable region; Portland is actually one of the most pro-growth cities in the nation and has made it easy (through progressive zoning codes and parking requirements–see below) for developers to construct high-quality yet affordable housing to meet the demand of the market.  As a result, Portland experienced much less of a boom and bust than cities in California, and currently has a median housing price is 40% that of San Francisco, 60% that of LA, and 80% that of Seattle, making it one of the most affordable cities on the West Coast.

Element #2: Smart Parking Management

A village of food carts lining a surface parking lot in Downtown Portland.

In the Bay Area, parking can turn conservatives into progressives and liberals into Teabaggers.  Because land is a limited resource and Portland must make the most of existing space, Portland has pioneered a number of interesting and innovative parking management practices.  The two most noticeable of these practices are the adaptive reuse of surface parking lots with food carts and the parking management policies around transit.

Unbeknownst to me before my visit, Portland is famous for its food carts, second to only New York City (which has about 14 times the population).  The 400+ carts range from Indian to Cambodian to Mexican to Brazilian and boast some of the best food in the entire city for a price of $5-$7 dollars.  What do food carts have to do with parking management? Whereas surface parking lots are traditionally one of the single biggest causes of blight in cities, Portland’s food carts play a vital role in fostering a vibrant street life where there otherwise would be none.  Food carts make surface parking lots work.

Portland is also a leader in smart parking policies around transit.  While many local governments maintain high parking requirements even in transit-rich areas, new developments in Portland near frequent transit (buses, light rail, and streetcars) have no parking requirements whatsoever.  Keep in mind this does not mean developers have stopped building parking altogether; it simply gives the power of determining parking ratios to developers and the housing market rather than local governments.  Since an average parking space adds $40,000 to the cost of a housing unit, allowing for unbundled parking with lower ratios has a huge effect on housing affordability near transit.  Even in booming areas such as the Pearl District, condos and live-work units currently start under $200,000–try and find that in San Francisco.

Element #3: Cost-Effective Transportation Choices

Portland’s transit system is geared toward providing the greatest amount of economic growth and mobility for the lowest price.  Over the past 15 years, Portland has had an extraordinary streak of New Starts-funded projects, having built five major MAX light rail extensions totaling nearly 38 miles (not to mention the 15 mile regionally-funded WES commuter rail and the 4 mile locally funded Portland Streetcar).  Yet, Portland’s still not finished, with the 3.3 mile Small Starts-funded Eastside Loop for the streetcar, and the 7.3 mile Milwaukie light rail extension, set to be completed by 2012 and 2015, respectively, as well as a 5 mile rapid streetcar extension to Lake Oswego (essentially a cheaper alternative to light rail) currently in planning and aiming to open in 2014.  The total cost of the 68 miles of rail that Portland will add between 1995 and 2015 is about 25% less than the cost of the 32.5 miles of BART extensions that the Bay Area will have had in the same time period (keep in mind these are just rough estimates adjusted for inflation).  Portland has also achieved better returns on its investment, with around three times the ridership as BART’s extensions (once again, semi-rough estimates).  Even with the fuzzy math, twice the mileage and three times the ridership for 3/4 the price is outstanding for TriMet and embarrassing for BART. As I’ve written too many times before, this enviable cost effectiveness is nothing new for other metro regions, but back to transit in Portland…

The most interesting aspect of Portland transit is its use of streetcars.  Portland’s streetcar system has a very specific function not as an urban circulator or glorified bus, but as a tool of placemaking.  When coupled with a progressive form-based zoning code and market-based parking requirements, the results of the streetcar have been staggering.  Since opening in 2001, 10,000 housing units and $4 billion in economic development have occurred within three blocks of the four mile streetcar line, and new districts have emerged such as the Pearl District, which I found to be one of the best urban neighborhoods I’ve ever been to.  For anyone who believes that streetcars are just glorified buses, I urge you to travel to Portland and see the clear difference for yourself.

Conclusion

Portland is still by no means perfect–there are still numerous aspects of the city’s urban fabric that could be improved.  Portland still has it’s fair share of surface parking lots, at times comically surrounding a streetcar line or light rail stops, and transit mode share is still rather low (13% within the city) considering the city’s reputation (non-commute trips seems to be a big source of ridership as well).  I would have liked to see some nicer buses–Portland was one of the first cities to invest in low-floor buses in the 1990s, but now they look pretty outdated compared to AC Transit’s Van Hools.  Portland could also use a greater investment in Rapid Bus/BRT for some of its major corridors.

View Larger Map

Above: Portland’s Lloyd District–Surface parking lot heaven, in spite of ample transit access (three light rail lines and a soon-to-be streetcar line)

Nevertheless, Portland has accomplished a feat which few other cities can attest to: creating a compact, affordable region with the right mix of densities and transit modes.  Unlike the Bay Area, Portland doesn’t have “www.trimetrage.com,” “www.trimetsucks.com,” or “www.rescuetrimet.com”–transit just works.  I was not able to spend too much time exploring Portland’s bicycle network, though it’s platinum rating, 8% mode share and ambitious plan for 25% of all trips by 2030 could fill up a number of posts themselves.  Overall, Portland is well on its way to becoming “the best European City in America,” leading other regions (such as the Bay Area) to seek to emulate its success.

More photos on the 21st Century Urban Solutions Flickr.

The Oakland Airport Connector continues to move along toward construction, but I thought I’d share an interesting conversation I had with a friend who’s familiar with the cable-propelled tram technology that BART has chosen as the cheapest (and slowest) option:

Apparently the tram technology that BART chose for the OAC is only in use in two places in the entire U.S.–the Mandalay Bay/Luxor/Excaliber and MGM Grand casinos in Las Vegas–and is essentially the same technology used in ski lifts.  When my friend (who works in Las Vegas transportation) heard that BART had chosen this technology, he was stunned at how they could make such a decision given the history of unreliability in the Mandalay Bay Tram.  The problem with cable-propelled trams is this: one small mechanical issue and the tram is out of commission for a considerable amount of time (rail engine issues can be fixed by switching to another vehicle; cable-propelled tram engine issues must be fixed by shutting down the entire system).  I did a quick search for news articles on breakdowns of the Mandalay Bay Tram and didn’t come across anything recent, but I’d be curious to find out how reliable this technology really is and why the OAC is the first transit project to be using it (if it is as reliable, as proponents claim).  The OAC odyssey continues…

BART’s suburban majority will keep focusing on projects that serve the suburbs… if they don’t they’ll just be voted out and replaced by someone who will.

But, that doesn’t mean that all urban projects are necessarily out. They just needed to be billed in a light that’s more attractive to the suburban BART rider/voter.

So, when we talk about expanding BART in the urban areas we should talk about it in terms of what it would provide as a destination of a trip rather than as a source. For example, rather than ‘BART on geary’, how about ‘BART to golden gate park!’ Or not ‘a second transbay tube’ but rather ‘BART to the ball park’. etc.

Expanding upon this idea, below are some potential rebrandings for good but boring projects to increase their suburban appeal, accompanied by the reactions of an average suburbanite:

Geary BART: “Sounds boring.  Isn’t Geary near all the drug addicts in the Tenderloin? No way, give us BART to Tracy!!!”

BART to Golden Gate Park: “OMG that would be so great! I never go to Golden Gate Park on weekends because it takes me two hours to drive there, but now I can just hop on in Lafayette and be there in no time! DeYoung here I come!”

San Antonio Station: “Where is San Antonio? Texas? Oh it’s in Oakland? Sounds like a place I wouldn’t want to go, since it’s not the airport, the coliseum, or Emeryville.”

Estuary Station: “Ooooo sounds environmental! Will I get to see sea otters and whales?”

Albany Station: “Well, I guess.”

Solano Ave/Albany: “How North Berkeley! I’ve read about it in the Chronicle’s ‘Yuppie’ section!”

Caltrain: “Ew”

pBart: “BART’s on the Peninsula??? And they built it overnight for free??? Awesome!”

98th Ave Station: well… can’t really think of a way to dress this one up.

A map, albeit an ugly one, of the alternatives under study for BART to Livermore. If BART really wants to sell this extension, maybe use a background color that isn't charcoal?

This post will be the first of a two part look at ridership estimates in public transit: first, looking at the merit of BART’s Livermore Extension; then, a more formal examination of ridership estimates as a whole.

As Transbay Blog reports, BART has just released the Draft Program EIR for its latest extension to Livermore, outlining five alternatives fill the 5.1-13.2 mile “gap” in BART service from Dublin to Livermore, a wealthy suburb of roughly 85,000 people.  The cost? $1.12-$3.8 billion.

This extension is really the latest in BART’s expansion paradigm that seeks to complete the system’s original goals of a seamless all-Bay system, while rewarding suburban taxpayers in the process.  Livermore is just one piece of BART’s next wave of expansion that includes San Jose, Antioch, and the Oakland Airport. I’ve often discussed how BART is really the only system in the nation that defies logic by building miles and miles of costly heavy rail subway technology to stretch its system to outlying suburbs, but today I’d like to focus on how BART has managed to keep getting funding for these projects with its ridership projections.  BART has justified the merit of the Livermore extension with forecasts that project as many as 38,000 new riders by 2035, which is not bad at all for a suburban extension.  But, before we jump to conclusions with these “facts”, let’s take a look at the performance of BART’s ridership estimates in its last wave of extensions in the 1990s:

Pittsburg/Bay Point–achieved 53% of its projected ridership

4.5 miles  $506 million (1996 dollars)

Daily ridership: 12,000 (2005 est.) 6,300 (2005 actual) 6,600 (2009)

Dublin/Pleasanton–achieved 74% of its projected ridership

14 miles $517 million (1996 dollars)

Daily ridership: 11,000 (2005 est.) 8,100 (2005 actual) 10,100 (2009)

SFO/Millbrae–achieved 45% of its projected ridership

8.2 miles $1.5 billion (2003 dollars)

Daily ridership: 34,300 (2010 est.) 15,500 (2009 actual)

Total, BART’s extensions have achieved an average of 52% of their projected ridership.

The Livermore extension alternatives fall into two groups: a longer two station alignment expected to attract 33,000-38,000 riders in 2035 for a cost of $3-4 billion, and a shorter one station alignment expected to attract 23,000-25,000 in 2035 for $1-1.75 billion.  Here’s the catch: BART reports these numbers in the EIR as boardings and exits, so already you can cut them in half to compare them with other stations, leaving us with roughly 17,000-19,000 riders for the two-station alternatives and 12,000 riders for the one-station alternatives (remember that Livermore is a city of about 85,000, yet BART is projecting as many riders per station as stations in Downtown Oakland, Downtown Berkeley, and the Mission).  Given that BART has on average only reached 52% of its long-term projections and has never exceeded 73%, it’s reasonable to expect about 9,000-10,000 riders for the two station alternatives and about 6,000 for the one station alternatives.  For the sake of this analysis, let’s give BART the benefit of the doubt and assume that actual ridership will be 73% of its projection, yielding 12,000 riders and 8,000 riders, respectively.

Let’s take a step back for a second: At 7-13 miles, BART to Livermore will cost $3-4 BILLION for a best-case scenario of 12,000 daily riders? As Barney Frank would say: on what planet does BART spend most of its time? BART would say that these are the most accurate models possible for 2035 transportation behavior, so it’s unfair to compare them with current ridership figures and past projects.  I say, what credibility does BART have left to make such assertions?  BART has NEVER delivered on its ridership estimates, and when the stakes at hand are billions and billions of dollars for one of our most effective responses to climate change, peak oil, declining public health, congestion, and population growth, why trust them now? Even the simple 5 mile, $1.5 billion for a maximum of 8,000 riders is a complete ripoff–as I’ve written before, Salt Lake City is building 70 miles of rail for $2.8 billion in seven years, while Denver is building 140 miles of rail and BRT for $6.2 billion in seven years.  In contrast, add together the great triumvirate of BART’s Livermore, San Jose/Warm Springs, and Oakland Airport extensions, and BART is building about 35 miles of heavy rail for $10.5 billion over the next two decades.

The issue here is how the Bay Area will make the most of federal, state, and regional funds in the next 25 years to deal with an additional 2 million people.  Transit money does not grow on trees; every extra dollar we pour into BART’s heavy rail system is a dollar that could be going toward Geary light rail, ACE, Capitol Corridor, Dumbarton rail, a streetcar system in Oakland, a better VTA light rail system, a region-wide BRT network, and ultimately a second transbay tube.  Between the Dublin/Pleasanton, Pittsburg/Bay Point, SFO/Millbrae, Livermore, and San Jose extensions, as well as the Oakland Airport Connector, the question becomes:

How many billions must we spend before we realize that BART’s heavy rail system is the single most cost-ineffective technology available?

Check out this funny article from Stanford’s fake news outlet, the Flipside.

The overcrowding on Bart as a result of the Bay Bridge closure this week reinforces the need for serious capacity improvements in the system.  Capacity problems permeate nearly every aspect of Bart–station access, platform area, vehicle space, train operations, parking, etc.–but while Bart has focused a lot on system expansion in recent years, it simply hasn’t put in the effort to meet the current and future needs of the existing system.  The overcrowding this week is not a freak occurrence; rather, it is a preview for what Bart will regularly face 10 years (or less?) down the road.  Population growth, climate change, peak oil, and traffic congestion are not simply going to go away, and until Bart/MTC can find the $10 billion that it’s going to take to build a second tube (probably in the next 50 years), Bart needs to invest in ways to maximize the efficiency of its current system through better station design, vehicle layout, parking management, transit and bicycle access, and train control.  We need to reinvest in Bart for a sustainable future.