A Dose of Reality for BART’s Livermore Extension

A map, albeit an ugly one, of the alternatives under study for BART to Livermore. If BART really wants to sell this extension, maybe use a background color that isn't charcoal?

This post will be the first of a two part look at ridership estimates in public transit: first, looking at the merit of BART’s Livermore Extension; then, a more formal examination of ridership estimates as a whole.

As Transbay Blog reports, BART has just released the Draft Program EIR for its latest extension to Livermore, outlining five alternatives fill the 5.1-13.2 mile “gap” in BART service from Dublin to Livermore, a wealthy suburb of roughly 85,000 people.  The cost? $1.12-$3.8 billion.

This extension is really the latest in BART’s expansion paradigm that seeks to complete the system’s original goals of a seamless all-Bay system, while rewarding suburban taxpayers in the process.  Livermore is just one piece of BART’s next wave of expansion that includes San Jose, Antioch, and the Oakland Airport. I’ve often discussed how BART is really the only system in the nation that defies logic by building miles and miles of costly heavy rail subway technology to stretch its system to outlying suburbs, but today I’d like to focus on how BART has managed to keep getting funding for these projects with its ridership projections.  BART has justified the merit of the Livermore extension with forecasts that project as many as 38,000 new riders by 2035, which is not bad at all for a suburban extension.  But, before we jump to conclusions with these “facts”, let’s take a look at the performance of BART’s ridership estimates in its last wave of extensions in the 1990s:

Pittsburg/Bay Point–achieved 53% of its projected ridership

4.5 miles  $506 million (1996 dollars)

Daily ridership: 12,000 (2005 est.) 6,300 (2005 actual) 6,600 (2009)

Dublin/Pleasanton–achieved 74% of its projected ridership

14 miles $517 million (1996 dollars)

Daily ridership: 11,000 (2005 est.) 8,100 (2005 actual) 10,100 (2009)

SFO/Millbrae–achieved 45% of its projected ridership

8.2 miles $1.5 billion (2003 dollars)

Daily ridership: 34,300 (2010 est.) 15,500 (2009 actual)

Total, BART’s extensions have achieved an average of 52% of their projected ridership.

The Livermore extension alternatives fall into two groups: a longer two station alignment expected to attract 33,000-38,000 riders in 2035 for a cost of $3-4 billion, and a shorter one station alignment expected to attract 23,000-25,000 in 2035 for $1-1.75 billion.  Here’s the catch: BART reports these numbers in the EIR as boardings and exits, so already you can cut them in half to compare them with other stations, leaving us with roughly 17,000-19,000 riders for the two-station alternatives and 12,000 riders for the one-station alternatives (remember that Livermore is a city of about 85,000, yet BART is projecting as many riders per station as stations in Downtown Oakland, Downtown Berkeley, and the Mission).  Given that BART has on average only reached 52% of its long-term projections and has never exceeded 73%, it’s reasonable to expect about 9,000-10,000 riders for the two station alternatives and about 6,000 for the one station alternatives.  For the sake of this analysis, let’s give BART the benefit of the doubt and assume that actual ridership will be 73% of its projection, yielding 12,000 riders and 8,000 riders, respectively.

Let’s take a step back for a second: At 7-13 miles, BART to Livermore will cost $3-4 BILLION for a best-case scenario of 12,000 daily riders? As Barney Frank would say: on what planet does BART spend most of its time? BART would say that these are the most accurate models possible for 2035 transportation behavior, so it’s unfair to compare them with current ridership figures and past projects.  I say, what credibility does BART have left to make such assertions?  BART has NEVER delivered on its ridership estimates, and when the stakes at hand are billions and billions of dollars for one of our most effective responses to climate change, peak oil, declining public health, congestion, and population growth, why trust them now? Even the simple 5 mile, $1.5 billion for a maximum of 8,000 riders is a complete ripoff–as I’ve written before, Salt Lake City is building 70 miles of rail for $2.8 billion in seven years, while Denver is building 140 miles of rail and BRT for $6.2 billion in seven years.  In contrast, add together the great triumvirate of BART’s Livermore, San Jose/Warm Springs, and Oakland Airport extensions, and BART is building about 35 miles of heavy rail for $10.5 billion over the next two decades.

The issue here is how the Bay Area will make the most of federal, state, and regional funds in the next 25 years to deal with an additional 2 million people.  Transit money does not grow on trees; every extra dollar we pour into BART’s heavy rail system is a dollar that could be going toward Geary light rail, ACE, Capitol Corridor, Dumbarton rail, a streetcar system in Oakland, a better VTA light rail system, a region-wide BRT network, and ultimately a second transbay tube.  Between the Dublin/Pleasanton, Pittsburg/Bay Point, SFO/Millbrae, Livermore, and San Jose extensions, as well as the Oakland Airport Connector, the question becomes:

How many billions must we spend before we realize that BART’s heavy rail system is the single most cost-ineffective technology available?

How Do We Solve Bicycle Congestion? Bikepool Lanes!

Check out this funny article from Stanford’s fake news outlet, the Flipside.

Bay Bridge Closure Reminds Us of BART Capacity Needs

The overcrowding on Bart as a result of the Bay Bridge closure this week reinforces the need for serious capacity improvements in the system.  Capacity problems permeate nearly every aspect of Bart–station access, platform area, vehicle space, train operations, parking, etc.–but while Bart has focused a lot on system expansion in recent years, it simply hasn’t put in the effort to meet the current and future needs of the existing system.  The overcrowding this week is not a freak occurrence; rather, it is a preview for what Bart will regularly face 10 years (or less?) down the road.  Population growth, climate change, peak oil, and traffic congestion are not simply going to go away, and until Bart/MTC can find the $10 billion that it’s going to take to build a second tube (probably in the next 50 years), Bart needs to invest in ways to maximize the efficiency of its current system through better station design, vehicle layout, parking management, transit and bicycle access, and train control.  We need to reinvest in Bart for a sustainable future.

Making Stairs Fun

Check out this project in Germany (?) to encourage people to take the stairs instead of an escalator:

Letter to the Editor: Blame for Collisions Misplaced

–Published in today’s Chronicle–

Blame for collisions misplaced

I am astounded by C.W. Nevius’ ignorance of the facts behind the causes of pedestrian collisions in San Francisco.

According to the Municipal Transportation Agency’s 2007 collision report, pedestrians caused one-third of all injury collisions, meaning that drivers were responsible for two out of every three pedestrian accidents.

Nevertheless, Nevius insists on blaming the victims, referring to pedestrians as “lackadaisical jaywalkers” who carelessly walk into traffic at their own expense.

San Francisco must address the epidemic of pedestrian collisions through calming car traffic so that everyone can be safe crossing the street.

DANIEL JACOBSON Stanford University

A Relic from San Francisco’s Freeway Revolt

In today’s Chronicle, there’s a great Letter to the Editor about the freeway revolt from Phillip Richardson, a San Francisco highway planner in the 1960s from Tiburon.

Thank you for the interesting article about the city taking back control of regional highways in its usual self-centered way (“Freeway Revolt set S.F.’s course,” Insight, Oct. 11).

The result transportation-wise is that there are congested streets – Oak, Fell, 19th Avenue and Lincoln Avenue – that would now be free of all through traffic and livable again. The two routes that you mention, Park-Panhandle and Golden Gate, were the only serious programs ever put forth by the state. They both were underground or depressed and would not have been noticed by city residents.

However, the Division of Highways was not set up to sell such a program, and the NIMBYs, as you call them, were totally ignorant of what they were contesting.

The result is serious regional highway disconnect and a quite reduced level of livability for the city.

PHILIP RICHARDSON,

Division of Highways planner

1961-69, Tiburon

There’s so much good stuff to dissect here.  Richardson’s core argument rests upon the belief that San Francisco’s freeway revolt was led by a group of “self centered” NIMBY residents “totally ignorant of what they were contesting.”  Richardson argues that some of San Francisco’s busiest streets–such as the 19th Ave, Lincoln, and the Panhandle–would be “free of all traffic and livable again” with “underground or depressed [freeways that] would not have been noticed by residents.”  Sounds great, doesn’t it?

Richardson fails to recognize his own self-centeredness as a suburban Marin driver, believing that San Francisco should completely change its cityscape to fit his desires.  Maybe he should actually go to Hayes Valley or the Embarcadero and ask residents if freeways made their neighborhoods more livable (I suspect the answer will be a “HELL NO!”).  The notion that residents would not even notice freeways is nonsense–imagine a depressed freeway in place of the Panhandle, or the surrounding traffic impacts of offramps and onramps along 19th Avenue.  The current situation on Fell/Oak, 19th Ave, and Lincoln is nothing near ideal, but it still beats bulldozing victorians and businesses for a traffic aquaduct (a really big traffic sewer? I tried).

Richardson’s backwards logic is a true relic of the postwar freeway boom in which central cities were expected to bend over backwards for the desires of their suburban residents.  If Richardson had his way, San Francisco would be split with freeways and even more gridlocked due to induced demand and insufficient capacity.  The most important lesson we can learn from is the arrogance implicit in Richardson’s argument–his assumption of the infallibility of the freeway plan and his dismissal of local objections as ignorant and irrational.  San Francisco’s freeway plan was not a fundamentally sound plan doomed by a poor marketing strategy; it was a selfish attempt by power-hungry suburbanites to fashion San Francisco into their own image at the expense of the city’s residents (especially the working class and Black populations).  The Freeway Revolt was one of the most pivitol moments in San Francisco’s history and the history of urban planning as a whole.  Without it, San Francisco would be an awful city to live in.

Salt Lake City: Yet Another City Leaping Ahead of the Bay Area in Transit Planning

There are some cities that don’t get enough nearly recognition for great urban design and transportation planning.  I have already discussed Denver at length, and their $6.2 billion FasTracks program that will add 140 miles of light rail, commuter rail, and BRT throughout the region.  Salt Lake City is another Western city that’s making smart, cost-effective transportation choices to fundamentally refashion their region into a more transit-oriented metropolis.

With a city population of just 181,000 and a regional population of 1.1 million, Salt Lake City does not usually come to mind when you think of major western cities.  Frankly, it doesn’t really come to mind when you think of progressive Western cities or fast-growing SunBelt cities either.  Nevertheless, Salt Lake City is surprisingly right there with Portland and Denver when it comes to bold, aggressive transit projects in the Western U.S.  Salt Lake City has just embarked on its FrontLines program, which will add 70 miles of rail in seven years at a cost of $2.8 billion.  Once completed in 2015, the mid-sized Salt Lake City region will boast a whopping 134 miles of light rail and commuter rail, in addition to 43 miles of BRT.

I have never been to Salt Lake City, but the FrontLines program is yet another example of what Bay Area transit planning could and should strive for: cost-effictive transit solutions that maximize efficiency and coverage throughout the region and serve as a framework for future growth.  FrontLines will cost less than one half of what Bart to San Jose will cost ($2.8 billion vs. $6.2 billion) while providing 4.5 times the rail-miles (70 miles versus 16 miles) in less than half the time (2015 opening vs. 2025 at the earliest).  Why? Like Denver and most other Western cities, Salt Lake City has a comprehensive regional planning agency that has not wedded itself to one mode of transportation (i.e. Bart), so it can get the most bang for its buck with light rail, commuter rail, BRT, etc. instead of relying on heavy rail even for low-ridership suburban projects.  The Bay Area will only continue to fall farther and farther behind until we can solve our leadership issues that get us into these boondoggles in the first place.

Last Thoughts on the Oakland Airport Connector

The Oakland Airport Connector is going to happen.

Last night, transit advocates came out in full force to the Oakland City Council chambers to argue for Rebecca Kaplan’s and Nancy Nadel’s resolution opposing the OAC.  In spite of admirable (and very entertaining) speeches by Transform, Oakland bloggers, and Oakland residents, the city council voted on a resolution conditionally supporting the OAC if it 1. ensures local hiring practices, 2. includes an intermediate stop, and 3. find a way to reduce the $6 fare.

Having thought it over, I can understand why the council came out in support of the OAC.  The reality is that their decision was not really an outcome of good transportation planning, providing an economic stimulus, or supporting Bart/MTC/OAK.  Council president Jane Brunner’s remarks said it all: Oakland hasn’t had a large-scale infrastructure project in four decades, and the council simply could not refuse the money to build the connector since some (not all) of these funds would go elsewhere.  This decision is a reflection upon the sad state of public works projects in the Bay Area–cities are forced to fight one-another for scarce funding (even with bad, costly projects), and there is no regional perspective whatsoever.  Oakland has been on the losing end of this fight since the 1960s, so why not go for some “free” money now?

Was there anything that transit advocates could have done differently? I don’t think so.  This is a project that Bart, MTC, and Larry Reid of the city council have been committed to building for decades, and the last real opportunity to change the project to BRT was in 2002.  Most city councilmembers supported TransForm’s proposal over the OAC, but it simply wasn’t viewed as practical, since it would take at least another 2-3 years to implement.

Where does this leave Oakland? Who knows.  The true direct and indirect consequences wont come out for months or even years.  Jobs will probably be lost in AC Transit, and it’s looking doubtful that Telegraph-International BRT project will happen (at least in it’s full form).  Moreover, this has put an even bigger strain on the relations between MTC/Bart and Oakland, so MTC/Bart could be done with Oakland projects for a while.

In the end, the Oakland Airport Connector was all about politics.  At 1am on a Tuesday night, the Oakland City Council had no desire to stop the first major fully-funded infrastructure project in the city since the opening of the Bart sytem almost 40 years ago.  There was simply too much political momentum that had built up over the past 20 years to kill this project, even if the benefits and logic behind it had slowly departed on their own 27mph monorail of shame years ago.  I guess that’s just the way it is.

HSR Lobby Blocks $500 million in Stimulus Funds for Capitol Corridor?

…Or at least that’s what the folk at the California Rail Foundation are claiming in their latest newsletter.  The article says:

HSRA is believed to have asked the Governor to block the Caltrans submissions because most of the Caltrans projects were shovel-ready, and therefore had a better chance of obtaining funding than did the Authority’s less defined projects.

The Governor’s decision means that California would discard most projects that could actually go out to bid in the near-term, to benefit $4.5 billion of high-speed rail applications that have much longer timelines, and are unlikely to meet the 2012 deadline. It is yet to be seen whether California’s gambit for over half the Federal ARRA stimulus funds will be at all successful.

Key phrase: “is believed to…” I think at this point you have to take any news on HSR from the California Rail Foundation with a grain of salt.  They were part of the unlikely alliance between NIMBYs in Atherton and Menlo Park and transit advocates TransDef, Bay Rail Alliance, and the Planning and Conservation League that sued the high speed rail authority (and essentially lost) over the allegedly corrupt selection of the Pacheco allignment, so their views of the authority have been skewed, to say the least.

Nevertheless, the fact that the Capitol Corridor’s funding proposals were left out of California’s $4.7 billion application for HSR stimulus funds will have a dramatic effect on the future of the Capitol Corridor.  The vast majority of the $500 million that the Capitol Corridor applied for would have improved tracks between Oakland and San Jose to allow for nearly all trains to travel to San Jose (current track usage and configuration limits Oakland-SJ trips to only about half of all Capitol Corridor trains, and creates an unnecessarily slow trip).  Upgrading this corridor is essential for the Bay Area’s and Northern California’s regional rail network (especially with Bart to San Jose delayed past 2025), and its very hard for the Capitol Corridor to find funds to pay for these upgrades in the first place.

It’s a shame that the Capitol Corridor’s projects weren’t included in the HSR application, but I have a feeling there’s more to it than the California Rail Foundation’s distorted account.  The Capitol Corridor is definitely not HSR, and while it could have potentially qualified for traditional passenger rail upgrades in the HSR stimulus, the governor and California state government were without a doubt focusing on jumpstarting the HSR project rather than other conventional rail projects.

For more information on this subject, be sure to read the California High Speed Rail Blog.

Can San Jose Really Handle 400,000 New Residents by 2035?

San Jose is projected to add 412,000 new residents by 2035.

ABAG recently released its new population growth estimates for the region, and not surprisingly, San Jose is projected to add the most people out of any city in the Bay Area over the next 25 years.  However, while San Jose’s low density and extensive land area makes it a logical place for infill growth, the amount that the city is slated to gain compared with other Bay Area cities–412,000 new residents, compared with 159,000 new residents in San Francisco and 141,000 new residents in Oakland–raises a bunch of red flags when you consider the current state and future prospects of San Jose’s transportation infrastructure.

There isn’t a whole lot of good things that you can currently say about transportation in and around San Jose.  VTA has put hundreds of millions into light rail over the past two or three decades (often at the expense of its bus system), yet its system is among the worst performing in the nation (its system-wide ridership is lower than many individual Muni lines).  Caltrain provides a decent but underdeveloped commuter service, but it’s primarily oriented toward the Peninsula and only two full-time stations in San Jose.  Capitol Corridor and ACE also provide intercity service, but their overall mode shares are very small.  Even driving doesn’t work that well–the vast majority of trips in San Jose are taken by car, causing gridlock to permeate throughout its extensive network of freeways, expressways, and boulevards.

So how do you turn a sprawling city into a transit-oriented metropolis? San Jose seems to think that Bart will completely transform the city, in spite of the project’s limited scope.  And, because of ballooning costs, the 6.2+ billion dollar extension will not even be completed until 2025 at the earliest.  As I’ve discussed before, VTA is placing all of its eggs in one basket with Bart to San Jose, coming at the expense of light rail and bus rapid transit projects that would tie together more of the city at a fraction of the cost.  Moreover, if/when Bart to San Jose doesn’t meet some of the extraordinary ridership projections that VTA has generated, and if/when Bart to San Jose doesn’t generate a surplus and actually causes VTA to lose tons of money as occurred to SamTrans in the SFO extension, VTA could be in big financial trouble for decades to come.  Even if Bart to San Jose works perfectly and I am completely proved wrong, San Jose will likely have already added 250,000 of the 412,000 new residents by 2025 anyway, with most of these additions occurring out of reach of the Bart line.

There is some hope.  High speed rail and Caltrain electrification will transform the area around Diridon and Taimen stations, and Downtown San Jose still has a lot of potential to become a vibrant dense urban environment.  In spite of financial woes with Bart to San Jose, VTA appears to remain comitted about implementing 30 miles of BRT on three major corridors in the next eight years, which will dramatically improve transit for a reasonable cost of $575 million (will these funds be subject to a Bart funding swap as occurred with Dumbarton Rail? We’ll see.).  In spite of these projects, San Jose is still essentially looking at adding another Oakland’s worth of population over the next 25 years.  Without a new comprehensive transit strategy that plans for widespread improvements across the city, San Jose could turn into a real mess.